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SITUATION III 
CpNTIGUOUS ZONES, AIRPLANES, AND 
NEUTRALITY 
State K has a leased area and has constructed a 
canal in State L upon terms· identical with those 
existing between the United States and Pa11ama. 
States U and V are at war. States K and L have 
issued declarations of neutrality. The Dominion 
of Vinta, which has the same relationship with 
State V that the British Dominions have with the 
United Kingdom, has issued a statement to the ef-
fect that it will abstain from participation in the 
war. State K has declared a ''protective zone,'' 
extending for a radius of 100 miles to sea from both 
exits of the canal, in which all naval and military 
craft of any state are forbidden to hover or navi-
gate unless intending to pass directly to or from the 
canal. 
(a) The Vera, a n1erchant vessel of Vinta, is 
attacked 'vhen 75 miles from the canal by the 
U1Lion, a cruiser of State U. The Vera asks for 
protection from the Komlo, a crt1iser of State K, 
which is nearby. 
(b) The Vincent, a cruiser of Vinta, remains in 
one of the canal ports for several days. State U 
protests to State K that the V ince'nt should be 
treated as a belligerent vessel. 
(c) The Vigo, a cruiser of State V, while 011 pa-
trol duty 110 miles from the canal, sends an air-
pla11e, the lT -1, to a port i11 the canal zone for 
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11eeded medical supplies. The V -1 takes back not 
only the medical supplies but also the naval at-
tache of the legation of State V in State L who 
has important inforn1ation for the Vigo. State 
U protests to State K that the latter has failed to 
fulfill its 11eutrality obligations by permitting the 
airplane and the attache to depart. 
(d) States, L, U, and V protest to State K that 
the ''protective zone'' is illegal. 
What are the legal rights in each case~ 
SOLUTION 
(a) The commander of the Ko1nlo should act to 
protect the Vera, thus conforming to the domestic 
law of his own State. The legality of the pro-
tective zone under international law depends 11pon 
its accepta11ce by other powers. In this instance, 
therefore, the protective zone is not recognized by 
international law and State U may attempt to 
hold State I{ internationally responsible. 
(b) It is legally possible for Vinta to be a neutral 
State. If the Dominion of Vinta. is recognized as 
a neutral by the belligerents, the V i1~cent may re-
Inain in the canal ports indefi11itely. 
(c) The V -1 has no right to e11ter neutral juris-
diction and the authorities of State K in the Canal 
Zone should have used the means at their disposal 
to prevent the departure of V -1. 
(d) States L, U, and V are not obliged to rec-
ognize the zone and their protests are legally valid. 
NOTES 
CONTIGUOUS ZONES 
It is generally agreed that 3 n1iles is the ntini-
1nttm limit of territorial waters. Tl1e Interna-
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tional Codification Conference at The Hague in 
1930 demonstrated that there is no universal agree-
ment upon the ttnax-imum extent of the littoral 
state's authority. The United States regards 3 
miles as the limit of American jurisdiction, but 
other powers have made claims for wider belts. 
(See Naval War College, International Law Situa-
tions, 1928, and Harvard Draft Code, Territorial 
Waters, American Journal of International Law, 
Supplement, April1929.) Within territorial wa-
ters, whatever may be their width, it is agreed that 
the State exercises complete jurisdiction, but be-
yond the marginal seas, international law recog-
nizes an attenuated or more limited kind of 
jurisdiction for special purposes. As Gidel says: 
"There is a maritime area beyond the limits of territorial 
waters, for an unspecified distance, in which the shore state 
possesses a certain jurisdiction over foreign vessels, a juris-
diction Tigorously limited to specific objects." 
(Le Droit International Public de la Mer, p. 361.) 
Fixed or ·exact limits for the special contiguous 
areas do not exist. International law has simply 
recognized that in certain circumstances for limited 
purposes littoral states may extend their jurisdic-
tion beyond territorial waters, and the limits of 
these areas vary and have varied greatly. Whether 
a contiguous zone is to be recognized in interna-
tional law depends upon the willingness of other 
nations to accept the claims of a state making 
pretentious to st1cl1 long-range jurisdiction. The 
law of nations recognizes the contiguous zone in 
principle, but fixes 110 bounds for it and does not 
specify in a11y comprehensive fasl1ion as to type 
or kind. Each claim to a zone must be exami11ecl 
individually, and it is a characteristic of these areas 
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that their legal basis rests upo11 the attitude of 
foreign states in each case. Any new claim to ju-
risdiction over foreign ships beyo11d the custo1nary 
marginal limits may 1neet with the objection of 
the foreign state or states affected. If the latter 
refuse to accord recog11ition, they may legally assert 
that the zone has no legal standing; if they give 
consent, either expressly or by failure, over a pe-
riod of tin1e, to make protest, the special area may 
be said to have been accepted as internationally 
valid . 
.A littoral state, therefore, has full jurisdiction 
for at least three miles and a limited and much mod-
ified jurisdiction for an indefinite number of miles 
beyond that. In the past, international law has 
recognized contiguous zones mainly for customs 
and fiscal purposes and only more rece11tly has 
begun to take account of special jurisdiction for 
defensive or neutrality purposes. There is 110thing 
new, therefore, about the contiguous zone in priil-
ciple; what is apt to be new is the atte111pt of a 
state to apply tl1e principle over a11 area or in 
regard to certain acts which otl1er powers n1ay not 
find acceptable. The declaratio11 of authority n1 a 
contiguous zone is therefore not necessarily biild-
ing upon other 11ations initially. Through accept-
ance, tacit or overt, it 1nay con1e to be recognized 
jn the law of nations, or through rejection it may 
fail to obtain legal standing. 
HISTORY OF CONTIGUOUS ZONES 
It was in the realm of customs and finance that 
special areas of jurisdictio11 beyond the normal 
li1nits first came to be recognized in international 
la,v. Britisl1 legislation of 1718 gave revenue au-
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thorities permission to board vessels intending to 
enter British ports at a distance considerably be-
yond 3 miles. A similar law of 1784 specified 12 
miles, and an act of 1805 declared a zone of 300 
miles in 'vhicl1 British ships, or vessels of certain 
foreign states, coming from certain countries 
loaded with certain goods of a certain quantity 
might be inspected by government agents. By 
legislation in 1853 and 1876 Great Britain aban-
doned all such efforts to control hovering and 
smuggling beyond the 3-mile limit, but the United 
States in 1790 and 1799 passed so-called hovering 
laws, modelled upon earlier British statutes, which 
l)ermitted American revenue authorities to board 
foreign ships destined for an American port up 
to a distance of 12 miles from shore. The Amer-
ican Tariff Act of 1922 gave boarding rights within 
12 miles even if the foreign craft had no intention 
of entering an American port. The treaties be-
tween the United States and other nations in 1924 
granted American agents boarding rights within 
1 hour's sailing distance from shore. 
It must be emphasized that these rights within 
12 miles or within 1 hour's sailing distance are 
strictly limited and do not grant the United States 
the complete jurisdiction which it of course pos-
sesses within the narrower band of territorial seas. 
It should also be stressed that the legislation just 
described was at first purely British or American 
domestic law and by no means constituted a part 
of international law. Through the years, however, 
American and British practice under these stat-
utes was accepted by other nations which in their 
turn have enacted comparable legislation. In 1936 
every state in the 'vorld except Great Britain, J a-
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pan, the N etl1erlands, Portugal, Y llgoslavia, and 
Colombia had special customs zones. The practice 
and llsage of nations therefore recognizes contigu-
ous zones for customs purposes. In 1935 the 
United States enacted an antismuggling act (49 
U. S. Stat. at Large, pt. 1, p. 517) 'vhich gave the 
President authority to proclaim so-called ''customs 
enforcement areas'' up to a distance 62 miles from 
the coast. Inasmuch as other states have not chal-
lenged the validity of this legislation it appears to 
have been regarded as not being incompatible with 
international law. This example well illustrates 
the point that customs areas have been accepted in 
principle and that each domestic alteration and ex-
tension depends upon the sufferance of other states. 
(For further n1formation on contiguous zones in 
general and customs areas in particular see Gidel 
op. cit. ; Harvard Draft Code on Territorial W a-
ters, op. cit.) 
CONTIGUOUS ZONES FOR DEFENSE AND 
OTHER PURPOSES 
Whether international law recognizes contiguous 
zones in principal for other than customs purposes 
is more problematical, but such areas for purposes 
of sanitation, security, and national defense have 
definitely acquired some standing. As early as 1804 
Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States 
Supreme Court in the celebrated case of Church vs. 
Hubbart (2 Cranch 187) declared that the power 
of a nation "to secure itself from injury may cer-
tainly be exercised beyond the limits of its terri-
tory.'' In 1864 the Government of France asked 
that the battle between the Alaban~a and the Kea1·-
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sarge be fought at a safe distance (more than 3 
miles) from the French coast, and in 1915 and 1916 
the United States Governme11t requested the Brit-
ish to order their vvarships not to hover close in 
to the 3-mile lil1e. Though in each of these in-
stances the requests 'vere made and acceded to upon 
the basis of comity and not of legal right, they 
were indicative of a trend. (For an account of 
the hovering by British warships during the last 
'var see Naval War College, International Law 
Situations, 1928, page 31.) By an act March 4. 
1917 (39 Stat. 1194; Naval War College Situations, 
1918, p. 162) the United States proclaimed ce~tain 
4 'defensive sea areas" and on August 27, 1917, a 
f"imilar sort of ''defensive sea area'' was proclaimed 
for Panama. (U. S. Off. Bull. 99, p. 8.) Though 
the zones inclllcled llnder these proclamations were 
not very extensive, the maximum width being only 
13 1niles, these "defense areas'' constituted an im-
lJortant precedent and, having been apparently un-
challenged, are of significance for the development 
of the principle of contiguous zones for defense 
purposes. 
The Harvard Draft Code on Rights and Duties 
of Neutral States, op. cit., recognizes the principle 
of neutral jurisdiction for protective purposes be-
yond 3 miles: 
ARTICLE 18. A belligerent shall not engage in hostile oper-
ations on, under or over the high seas so near to the terri-
tory of a neutral State as to endanger life or property 
therein. 
ARTicLE 19. A belligerent shall not pern1it its warships 
or military aircraft to hover off the coasts of a neutral 
State in such n1anner as to harass the cotrunerce or industry 
of that State. 
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THE DECLARATION OF PANAMA, OCTOBER 3, 
1939 
The Governments of the American Republics meeting at 
Panama, have solemnly ratified their neutral status in the 
conflict 'vhich is disrupting the peace of Europe, but the pres-
ent war may lead to unexpected results 'vhich may affect the 
fundamental interests of America and there can be no 
justification for the interests of the belligerents to prevail 
over the rights of neutrals causing disturbances and suffer-
ing to nations which by their neutrality in the con-
flict and their distance from the scene of events, should not 
be burdened with its fatal and painful consequences. 
During the World War of 1914--1918 the Governments 
of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru 
advanced, or supported, individual proposals providing in 
principle a declaration by the American Republics that the 
belligerent nations must refrain from committing hostile 
acts within a reasonable distance from their shores. 
The nature of the present conflagration, in spite of its al-
ready lamentable proportions, would not justify any obstruc-
tion to inter-American communications which, engendered 
by important interests, call for adequate protection. This 
fact requires the demarcation of a zone of security including 
all the nonnal maritime routes of communication and trade 
between the countries of America. 
To this end it is essential as a n1easure of necessity to 
adopt immediately provisions based on the above-mentioned 
precedents for the safeguarding of such interests, in order 
to avoid a repitition of the damages and sufferings sus-
tained by the American nations and by their citizens in the 
war of 1914--1918. 
There is no doubt that the Governments of the American 
Republics must foresee those dangers and as a measure of 
self-protection insist that the 'vaters to a reasonable distance 
from their coasts shall remain free from the commission of 
hostile acts or from the undertaking of belligerent activities 
by nations engaged in a war in 'vhich the said governments 
are not involved. 
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For these reasons the Governn1ents of the American Re-
publics RESOLVE AND HEREBY DECLARE: 
1. As a measure of continental self-protection, the Ameri-
can Republics, so long as they maintain their neutrality, 
are as of inherent right entitled to have those waters adjacent 
to the American continent, which they regard as of primary 
concern and direct utility in their relations, free from the 
commission of any hostile act by any non-American bellig-
erent nation, whether such hostile act be attempted or made 
from land, sea or air. 
Such waters shall be defined as follows. All waters com-
prised within the limits set forth hereafter except the ter-
ritoTial waters of Canada and of the undisputed colonies 
and possessions of European countries within these limits: 
Beginning at the terminus of the United States-Canada 
boundary in Passamaquoddy Bay, in 44°46'36" north lati-
tude, and 66 o 54'11" west longitude; 
Thence due east along the parallel 44°46'36" to a point 
60° west of Greenwich; 
Thence due south to a point in 20° north latitude; 
Thence by a rhumb line to a point in 5° north latitude, 
24° west longitude; 
Thence due south to a point in 20° south latitude; 
Thence by a rhumb line to a point in 58° south latitude, 
57° west longitude; 
Thence due west to a point in 80° west longitude; 
Thence by a rhumb line to a point on the equator in 97° 
west longitude; 
Thence by a rhumb line to a point in 15° north latitude, 
120° west longitude; 
Thence by a rhumb line to a point in 48°29'38" north 
latitude, 136 o west longitude; 
Thence due east to the Pacific terminus of the United 
States-Canada boundary in the Strait of Juan de Fuca. 
2. The Governments of the American Republics agree that 
they will endeavor, through joint representation to such 
belligerents as may now or in the future be engaged in hos-
tilities, to secure the compliance by them with the provisions 
of this Declaration, without prejudice to the exercise of 
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the individual rights of each State inherent in their sover-
eignty. 
3. The Governn1ents of the An1erican Republics further 
declare that whenever they consider it necessary they will 
consult together to determine upon the n1easures which they 
1nay individually or collectively undertake in order to secure 
the observance of the provisions of this Declaration. 
4. The America} Republics, during the existence of a state 
of 'var in which they themselves are not involved, may 
undertake, whenever they 1nay determine that the need there-
for exists, to patrol, either individually or collectively, as 
may be agreed upon by common consent, and insofar as the 
1neans and resources of each 1nay permit, the 'vaters adjacent 
to their coasts within the area above defined. 
(Deparbnent of State Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 15, October 7, 
1939, pp. 331-333.) 
BRITISH ADMIRALTY STATEMENT ON THE 
PANAMA DECLARATION 
Several unofficial reports have heM received recently of 
the important decisions reached at the Panan1a conference of 
the republics of America. These reports are to the effect 
that a neutral or safety zone of variously stated depth from 
the coast is to be established. 
It is understood that the zone is in no 'vay intended as an 
extension of territoral waters, but belligerents are to be 
invited to accept the limitation of their operations which 
'vould be involved by the scheme. This is clearly the wisest 
way of proceeding, since while belligerents, and particularly 
the Allies, n1ay be anxious to assist all neutral countries in 
keeping war from the proximity of their coasts, it 1nust be 
for them to decide whether or not to accept restrictions 
'vhich would limit their enjoyment of certain 'veil-established 
rights. 
Neutral States are entitled and bound to de1nand that 
belligerents shall abstain from hostilities in their territorial 
"raters and it is not a hostile act if a neutral repels even by 
force an attack upon his neutrality. During the great war 
N or,vay, Sweden, Spain and Holland forbade belligerent 
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submarines to enter their territorial ·waters except in case of 
distress. 
In olden tin1es n1any e...xtra vagant claims "~ere put forward 
by the various nations as to the lin1it of their territorial 
waters, but since those days such claims have been drastically 
modified and it is no'v generally recognized that no country 
can properly claiin jurisdiction over large areas of ocean nor 
the right to control or exclude the mo\eJ.nents of foreign 
ships on' the high seas this applies equally to belligerent 
operations though a belligerent can of course restrict his 
operations of his own free ·will if he so wishes. 
Since the Great War the in1portance of the limit of t~rri­
torial waters has been brought to the notice of the public in 
several ways, a1nong others by reason of the national Prohi-
bition Act of An1erica. Resulting from discussions 'vith 
Great Britain an agree1nent was reached in Washington in 
192'4 whereby the United States was given a right to board 
and examine any British vessel suspected of being engaged 
in liquor smuggling at a distance from the coast that could be 
traversed by that vessel in one hour. 
By the san1e agreement Great Britain and America de-
clared that it was their firm intention to uphold the principle 
that three marine miles extending :from the coast line out-
wards and n1easured from low-water mark, should constitute 
the proper limits of territorial waters. Sin1ilar agreements 
were subsequently entered into by America "~ith Germany 
and Sweden. 
Certain bays, straits and canals have :fron1 time to ti1ne 
been the subject o:f special international agreement so that 
when questions o:f jurisdiction and sovereignty arise careful 
reference n1ust be 1nade to any agreements applicable to the 
particular case. The 'vidth o:f the general belt or ·te.rritorial 
'vaters is no'v "~idely accepted as being three miles. Great 
Britain in com1non with many other countries has long 
refused to recognize claims to a territorial belt o:f great "ridth. 
(New York Times, October 14, 1939.) 
AMERICAN REPUBLICS' STATEMENT ON THE. 
"GRAF VON SPEE" INCIDENT 
Follo"~ing the procedure o:f consultation provided in the 
Declaration o£ Pana1na, the 21 A1nerican republics have 
70 
agreed upon the following staten1ent which the President of 
the Republic of Panama has transmitted in their names to 
the Governments of France, Great Britain, and Ger1nany : 
"The American Governments are officially informed of 
the naval engagement which took place on the thirteenth in-
stant off the northeastern coast of Uruguay, between certain 
British naval vessels and the Ger1nan vessel Graf Von Spee, 
which, according to reliable reports, at~mpt.ed to overhaul 
the French merchant vessel Formose· between Brazil and 
the port of Montevideo after having sunk other merchant 
vessels. 
"They are also informed of the entry and scuttling of the 
German warship in the waters of the River Plate upon the 
ter1nination of the time limit which, in accordance 'vith the 
rules of international law, 'vas granted to it by the Govern--
ment of the Republic of Uruguay. 
"On the other hand, the sinking or detention of German 
merchant vessels by British vessels in American waters is 
publicly known, as appears-to begin with-from the recent 
cases of the Du~seldorf, U ssukuma, and others. 
"All these facts which affect the neutrality of American 
waters, compromise the aims of continental protection pro-
vided for by the Declaration of Panama of October 3, 1939, 
the first paragraph of which establishes: 
" 'As a measure of continental self-protection, the Ameri-
can Republics, so long as they maintain their neutrality, 
are as of inherent right entitled to have those waters adja-
cent to the American continent, which they regard as of 
primary concern and direct utility in their relations, free 
from the commission of any hostile act by any non-American 
belligerent nation, whether such hostile act be attempted 
or made from land, sea, or air.' 
"Therefore, in accordance with the method provided for in 
that instrument and with a vie'v to avoiding the repetition 
of further events of the nature to which reference is made 
above, the American nations resolve to lodge a protest with 
the belligerent countries and to initiate the necessary con-
sultation in order to strengthen the system of protection in 
common through the adoption of adequate rules, among 
them those which 'vould prevent belligerent Yessels from 
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supplying the1nselves and repairing damages in American 
ports, 'vhen the said vessels have committed 'varlike acts 
within the zone of security established in the Declaration of 
Panama." 
(Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 26, December 
23, 1939, p. 723.) 
BELLIGERENTS' REPLY TO NEUTRALITY ZONE 
PROTEST 
Great B1·itain: 
1. His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom have 
devoted most careful consideration to the communication 
agreed upon unanimously by the twenty-one American re-
publics, the text of which was telegraphed to His Majesty the 
1\::ing by the Acting President of Pana1na on Dec. 23 last. 
In that communication reference was made among other 
matters to the recent naval action between British and Ger-
man warships in the Sou~h Atlantic and to the maritime se-
curity zone described in the declaration at Panama on Oct. 3, 
1939. 
2. His ~1ajesty's Government, who themselves for so long 
strove to prevent war, fully appreciate the desire of the Amer-
ican republics to keep war a'vay from shores of the American 
Continent. It was, therefore, not merely 'vith interest but 
with understanding that His l\fajesty's Government learned 
of the maritime security zone proposal. 
His Majesty's Government noted with satisfaction from the 
Declaration of Panama itself that an attempt would be made 
to base observance of its provisions upon the consent of the 
belligerents. This fresh expression of adherence to the idea of 
solving international difficulties by mutual discussion, which 
always has been upheld by the American Republics, confirmed 
His Majesty's Government's belief that these powers would 
not attempt to enforce observance of the zone by .unilateral 
action and encouraged their hope that it would be possible 
to give effect, by means of negotiation, to the intentions 'vhich 
inspired it. 
3. It was in this spirit that His ~iajesty's Government were 
. examining the proposal of the conference of Panama at the 
time when the con1munication of Dec. 23 was received. In 
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view of this con1munication, His l\1ajesty's Government desire 
to draw attention of the American Republics to the following 
considerations: 
4. It will be apparent, in the first place, that the proposal, 
involving as it does abandonment by belligerents of certain 
legitimate belligerent rights, is not one which, on any basis of 
int~rnational law, can be imposed upon them by unilateral 
nctions and that its adoption requires their specific assent. 
5. Acceptance by His l\faj esty's government of the sugges-
tion that belligerents should forego their rights in the zone 
must clearly be dependent upon their being satisfied that 
adoption of the zone proposal would not provide German 
warships and supply ships with vast sanctuary from which 
they could emerge to attack Allied and neutral shipping~ 
to which they could return to avoid being brought into action 
and in which acts of unneutral service might be performed 
by German ships, for example, by using wireless communi-
cations. 
It would also be necessary to insure that German war-
ships and supply ships would not be enabled to pass with 
impunity from one ocean to another through the zone, or 
German merchantships to take part in inter-American trade 
and earn foreign exchange which might be used in attempts 
to promote subversion and sabotage abroad and procure sup-
plies for prolongation of the war, thus depriving the Allies of 
the fruits of their superiority at sea. 
6. Moreover, acceptance of the zone proposals would have 
to be on the basis that it should not constitute a precedent 
for far-reaching alteration of existing laws on maritime 
neutrality. 
7. Unless these points are adequately safeguarded, the 
zone proposals might only lead to accumulation of bellig-
erent ships in the zone. This, in turn, might well bring the 
risk of war nearer the American States and lead to fric-
tion between, on the one hand, the Allies, pursuing their 
legitill\at~ beLligerent activities, a.nd, on the otl$r, the 
American republics endeavoring to make this new policy 
prevail. 
8. The risk of such friction, which His Majesty's Govern-
ment would be the first to deplore, would be increased by the 
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application of sanctions. His ~fajesty's Government n1ust 
emphatically repudiate any suggestion that His Majesty's 
ships have acted or would act in any way that would justify 
adoption by neutrals of punitive measures which do not 
spring from accepted canons of neutral rights and obli-
gations. 
If, therefore, the American States were to adopt a schen1e 
of sanctions for enforcement of the zone proposal they would, 
in effect, be offering sanctuary to German warships within 
which His Majesty's ships would be confronted with the 
invidious choice of having either to refrain from engaging 
their enemy or of laying themselves open to penalties in 
.... ~merican ports and ''aters. 
9. Up to the present it does not appear that means have 
been found by which disadvantages of the zone proposals 
could be eliminated. That this is the case was sho,vn by 
dperation in the zone of the warship Ad1niral Graf Spee 
and the supply ship Taco1na. vVith regard to specific inci-
dents, of which mention 'vas made in communications under 
reply, His ~1ajesty's Government must observe that legiti-
mate activities of His Majesty's ships can in no way i1nperil 
but must rather contribute to the security of the Ame.rican 
Continent, protection of which was the object of the framers 
of the Declaration of Panama. 
His Majesty's Government cannot admit that there is any 
foundation for the claim that such activities have in any way 
exposed them to justifiable reproach, seeing that the zone 
proposal had not been n1ade effective and belligerent assent 
had not yet been given to its operation. 
10. In view of the difficulties described above, it appears 
to His Majesty's Government that the only 1nethod of achiev-
ing the American object of preventing belligerent acts within 
the zone would be: firstly, to ensure that the Ger1nan Govern-
1nent would send no n1ore 'varships into it; secondly, there 
are obvious difficulties in applying the zone proposal at this 
stage of the 'var 'vhen so much German shipping already 
has taken refuge in An1erican waters. 
If the Allies are asked to forego the opportunity of cap-
turing these vessels it would also seem to be necessary that 
247670-40-6 
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they should be laid up under Pan-A1nerican control for the 
duration of the war. 
11. In the view of His ~fajesty's Government, it would 
<>nly be by means such as those indicated that the wish of 
American governments to keep \var away from their coasts 
could be realized in a truly effective and equitable n1anner. 
Until His ~fajesty's Government are able to feel assured 
that the scheme will operate satisfactorily they must, 
anxious as they are for fulfillments of American hopes, 
necessarily reserve their full belligerent rights in order to 
£ght the 1nenace presented by Ger1nan action of policy and 
to defend that conception of law and that way of life which 
they believe to be as dear to the people's governments of 
America as they are to the people's govern1nents in the 
British Co1nmonwealth of Nations. 
(Department of State Bulletin, 'T ol. 11, No. 35, February 
24, 1940, pp. 199-201.) 
Fra,nce: 
The French Government has attentively examined the Pan-
anla President's communication of Dec. 23, following the 
unani1nous accord of the t\venty -one American republics. 
The communication referred to the naval action occurring 
bet,veen British and German men-of-war after the [German 
pocket battleship] Admiral Graf Spee attempted to reach the 
French freighter F ormose in order to destroy it. 
2. This communication refers to the desire manifested by 
the A1nerican republics in their declaration of Panan1a to see 
war excluded from the shores of the American continents. 
The French Government, which for a long ti1ne has sought to 
avoid war, fully appreciates the .American republics' desire 
.and has examined in the most sympathetic spirit their pro-
posal tending to the creation of a maritime security zone. 
The French Government interprets the demarches made in 
behalf of the American governments, including that of Dec. 
23 as well as the previous communication of the Declaration of 
Panama, as implying in the minds of the .American govern-
ments that the constitution of such a zone, involving Tenun-
cia tion by belligerent states of the exercise in vast territories 
-of rights well established by international custom, could only 
result from an accord between all the interested states. 
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3. Recent facts discussed in the co1nmunication addressed 
to the French Government in behalf of the twenty-one Ameri-
can republics clearly illustrate the situation which is to be 
regulated. These facts proceed from the Ailrniral Graf 
Spee's attempt to attack and destroy in the maritime security 
zone the French cargoship Formose. It is clear that under 
the present circumstances of war such attempts by German 
vessels can have no effect upon the outcome of the war. 
It is no less clear, however, that if such acts are committed 
or attempted, France and Great Britain are strictly entitled 
to carry out counter-attacks in useful time and that they can-
not be asked to renounce that right. It follows that if the 
security zone is to materialize as desired by the American gov-
ernments, it is indispensable that the latter give the French 
Government satisfactory assurance that the German Govern-
ment will not send warships or supply ships into the zone. 
The incontestable superiority France and Great Britain 
have over Germany in the Atlantic and the Pacific has had 
the result that many German cargo ships have been able to 
escape legitimate exercise of the prize law only by taking 
refuge in American ports. The institution of a security 
zone ought not to have the effect of liberating them, thus 
depriving the Allies of advantages following from their 
naval superiority over Germany. Hence it ought to entail 
effective measures taken by each American government cal-
culated to keep German ships in ports where they have 
taken refuge. 
5. The American governments do not appear to envisage 
or assume responsibpity to ensure in the vast spaces con-
stituting their ne~trality zone repression of acts of hostile 
assistance or un-neutral service. The possibility of such 
acts is so great, especially in vie'v of radio communication, 
that the French naval forces should not be deprived of the 
right of preventing them and repressing them by all means 
'vitl1in the limits of international law. 
6. It is on this basis, if the American governments obtain 
its acceptance by all belligerents, that realization of the aim 
desired by the American governments ought to be sought, 
in the opinion of the French Government. 
7. The French Government realizes thatl in vie'v of the 
novelty of methods and extension of the zone, divergence of 
76 
vie\YS may arise in concrete cases. These 1night, at least, be 
easily treated by diplo1natic channels i:£ one chooses to apply 
the 1nethod of frank discussion and mutual accord regarding 
principle as "~en as application. On the contrary, regret-
table friction n1ight be pro-vo:Ked if unilateral procedure were 
adopted, abandoning the habitual practice of nations. 
These frictions 'vould be particularly gra-ve if they arose 
fro1n punitive n1easures against ships not guilty of any in-
fraction of international law. Refusal in such cases to grant 
refuge or refueling possibilities to a warship would consti-
tute an unpleasant contrast with the line of conduct that the 
Uruguayan Governn1ent adopted with regard to the Ad-
1niral Graf Spee. 
8. The French Governn1ent hopes by this exposition of 
views to have contributed to realization of the ai1ns inspir-
ing the t"·enty-one American republics. At the same ti1ne 
it expects that the latter will admit that as long as no accord 
is reached on the abo-ve basis the French Government retains 
full exercise of a belligerent's rights based upon interna-
tional law~ which n1ust enable it to safeguard the principles 
of right and the conception of life which it shares with the 
A1nerican govern1nents and peoples. 
(Ibid. pp. 201-203.) 
Ge~rnza1LY: 
(1) The Gern1an GoYernment ''elco1nes the intention of 
the An1erican Republics, expressed in the Declaration of 
Panama, to maintain strict neutrality during the present con-
flict, and fully understands that they wish, as far as possible~ 
to take precautionary action against the effects of the pres-
ent war on their countries and peoples. 
(2) The Ger1nan Go-vernment believes itself to be in 
agreement with the An1erican GoYernments that the regula-
tions contained in the Declaration of Panama would 1nean a. 
change in existing international law and infers fron1 the 
telegram of October 4th of last year that it is desired to 
settle this question in harmony with the belligerents. The 
German Go-vernment does not take the stand that the hith-
erto recognized rules of international law ''ere bound to be 
regarded as a rigid and fore-ver in1mutable order. It is 
rather of the opinion that these rules are capable of and 
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require adaptation to progressive developtnent and newly 
arising conditions. In this spirit, it is also ready to take 
up the consideration of the proposal of the neutral An1erican 
Governments. However, it must point out that for the Ger-
n1an naval vessels which have been in the proposed security 
zone so far, only the rules of law now in effect could, of 
course, be effective. The German naval vessels have held 
most strictly to these rules of la'v during their operations. 
'fherefore in so far as the protest submitted by the American 
Governments is directed against the action of German 'var-
ships, it cannot be · recognized by the German Government 
as well grounded. It has already expressed to the Govern-
1nent of Uruguay its divergent interpretation of the law also 
in the special case mentioned in the telegram of the Acting 
President of the Republic of Pana1na of December 24th. 
Besides, the German Government cannot recognize the right 
of the Governments of the A1nerican Republics to decide 
unilaterally upon measures in a manner deviating from the 
rules hitherto in effect, such as are to be taken under consid-
eration by the American Governtnents against the ships of the 
belligerent countries which have committed acts of war 
within the waters of the projected security zone, according 
to the telegram of December 24th of last year. 
( 3) Upon considering the questions connected with the 
plan for the establishment of the security zone, there arises 
first of all one important point which causes the situation 
of Gern1any and the other belligerent powers to appear 
disparate with respect to this: that is, while Germany has 
never -pursued territorial aims on the American continent, 
Great Britain and France have, however, during the course 
of the last few centuries, established important possessions 
and bases on this continent and the islands offshore, the prac-
tical importance of which also with respect to the questions 
under consideration here does not require any further ex-
planation. By these exceptions to the Monroe Doctrine in 
favor of Great Britain and France the effect of the security 
zone desired by the neutral American Govern1nents is funda-
mentally and decisively impaired to start with. The in-
equality in the situation of Ger1nany and her adversaries 
that is produced hereby might perhaps be eliminated to 
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a certain extent if Great Britain and France would pledge 
the1nselves, under the guaranty of the American States, 
not to make the possessions and islands mentioned the 
starting points or bases for military operations; even if that 
should come about the fact would still remain that one 
belligerent state, Canada, not only directly adjoins the zone 
mentioned in the 'vest and the east, but that portions of 
Canadian territory are actually surrounded by the zone. 
( 4) Despite the circun1stances set forth above, the German 
Government, on its side, would be entirely ready to enter 
into a further exchange of ideas with the Governments of 
the American Republics regarding the putting into effect 
of the Declaration of Panama. However, the German Gov-
ernment must assume fron1 the reply of the British and 
French Govern1nents, recently published by press and radio, 
that those two governments are not willing to take up seri-
ously the idea of the security zone. The mere fact of the 
setting up of demands according to which entrance into the 
zone mentioned is not to be permitted to German warships, 
while the warships of the adversaries are officially to retain 
the right to enter the zone without restriction, shows such 
a lack of respect for the most elementary ideas of inter-
nationallaw and imputes to the governments of the Ameri-
can states such a flagrant violation of neutrality that the 
German Government can see therein only the desire of the 
British and French Governments to do away with the basic 
idea of the security zone, first of all. 
( 5) Although the German Government is entirely ready 
to enter into the proposals and suggestions of the An1erican 
states in this field, the German Government can feel certain 
of a success of the continuation of the plan of the security 
zone only when the British and French position that has 
been made known is fundamentally revised. 
(Ibid. pp. 203-205.) 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE DECLARATION 
OF PANAMA 
As previously indicated, there is evidence in the 
practice of nations to support the assei"tion that, 
i11 principle, 11eutral states may exercise their au-
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thority over foreign ships beyond the territorial 
limits with the aim of protecting their shores from 
the effects of belligerent operations~ How far may 
neutrals exercise their authority over the vessels of 
warring powers~ No definite answer can be given 
to this query. It must be remembered that the 
neutrals' jurisdiction is one strictly limited to the 
ends of national defense; the net1tral may not ex-
ercise general authority over belligerent warships 
Olltside of the area of territorial waters, but has 
a right to adopt only those measures which clearly 
are required to safeguard neutral life and property. 
Upon the high seas, by imn1emorial right, the bel-
ligerent may visit and search neutral craft, may 
capture enemy merchant ships, and may attack 
enemy 'varships. The neutral claims as to defense 
may thllS come into direct conflict with a belliger-
ent's rights upon the high seas. Neutral defense 
jurisdiction must thus be narrowly circumscribed 
and must not exceed the genuine requirements of 
domestic safety. The principle of contiguous 
zones for neutrals is probably crystallizing, but 
there is certainly no law concerning the extent of 
such areas. Belligerents have the legal right to 
challenge each specific assertion of jurisdiction,. 
and a neutrality zone cannot be said to have been 
accepted into internatio11allaw as long as other na-
tions withhold their assent. The ability of the Ileu-
tral to patrol the area involved and to exercise the 
jllrisdiction claimed is also an important factor. 
Belligerents naturally would be reluctant to refrain 
from hostility in 'vide areas i11 'vl1ich a neutral 
could not possibly man1tain any reasonable degree 
of authority. So1ne fairly close corresponde11ce 
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111ust exist bet,veen the clain1s to authority and the 
ability to exercise authority. 
The Declaration of Panama is not a part of in-
ternational law. Neutral jurisdiction for defense 
purposes over a part of the ocean extending 300 
miles from the coast is 'vithout precedent and has 
not been generally accepted. There is agreement 
probably upon the principle but not upon its appli-
cation to such a tremendously wide belt. Great 
Britain, France, and Germany were acting within 
tl1eir legal rights when they refused to recog1rize 
the binding nature of the Panama Declaration. 
Only the status of that Declaration in international 
law is being discussed here; its feasibility politi-
eally or otherwise is an entirely separate problen1. 
APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT CASE 
Thot1gh the protective zone proclaimed by State 
K is of doubtful standing in international law, the 
commander of the cruiser Kon~lo must obey tl1e 
orders of his home government and should use 
force if necessary to protect the V e'ra from attack 
by the Union. State U, however, may protest to 
State K and may claim that it has been deprived of 
one of its legitimate belligerent rights. State K 
cannot mal{e international la'v unilaterally. Its 
protective zone is not necessarily binding upon bel-
ligerents, and if these latter reft1se to accord recog-
nition to the zone, State K may well be held liable 
for an infringement upon the rights of the states at 
war. In this instance, however, a zone extending 
100 miles from the exits of a canal, that is, a zone 
proclaimed within a fairly limited area and having 
a close relation to the canal's defense requirements, 
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seems to have a much better chance of obtai11ing 
universal acceptance than the far more extensive 
claims put forth in the Declaratio11 of Panama. 
The fact that State K could doubtless patrol sucl1 
an area in reasonably effective fashion makes the 
project a rather feasible one. Therefore i11 time 
State K might persuade other nations to accord 
it recognition, but, at the moment, the belligerent 
powers are under no obligation to look upon it as. 
la,v. 
NEUTRALITY OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS 
Prior to the outbreak of war in September 1939t 
there '\Vas considerable discussion concerni11g the 
legal authority of the British Dominions to be neu-
tral in any war in wl1ich Great Britain was a bel-
ligerent. Common ties with the Crown, commo11 
British citizenship, and special military and naval 
rights of Great Britain within Dominion terri-
tories were among the factors which seemed to pre-
clude the possibility that some parts of the British 
Commonwealtl1 of Nations could remain aloof 
from a conflict in which other portions of tl1e Coi11-
monwealtl1 were engaged. The Union of South 
Africa, however, made provision in its Constitution 
ii11926 that the Union never could be at war with-
out the consent of its own Parliament, and Article 
28 of the Irish Free State Constitution, whicl1 went 
into effect on December 29, 1937, lil{e,vise pro-· 
vided that the Free State could not be involved 
in 'var save by its own will. (Constitutio11 of Ire-
land, Article 28, section 3, subsection 1. H. JVI. Sta-
tionery Office, Cortstit~ttions of All Coulntries, Vol. 
I: The British Empire, p. 206.) By the Treaty of 
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April25, 1938, between Great Britain and the Irish 
Free State (Eire, Treaty Series, 1938, No. 1) the 
former surrendered to. the latter all atlthority over 
the naval bases of Berebave11, Cobb, and Lough 
Swilly, ports which the British had kept 'vithin 
their jurisdiction in the Articles of Agreement of 
December 6, 1921, between the Free State and Great 
Britain. As a result of these constitutional provi-
sions and treaty arrangements, the legal obstacles 
in the way of adoption of neutrality by the Free 
State and the Union of South Africa had been 
Jargely removed, though the obligations of the latter 
i11 regard to the naval base at Simondstown still 
-continued to complicate matters for the Union 
Government. The other Dominions, Canada, Aus-
tralia, and N e'v Zealand, lacked legislation on the 
subject of neutrality. It was thought in some 
quarters that a Dominion might adopt a position 
of ''passive'' 11eutrality, a status with implications 
of much ambiguity for international law. 
In the main, however, the neutrality of the Do-
minions depends upon the facts in any given situa-
tion. If a Dominion declares that it is ne11tral 
and if the belligerents recognize it as neutral, then 
tit is neutral. It is a question of actuality 11ot 
theory, as was demonstrated by the events of Sep-
tember 1939. On September 2, the Dail Eireann 
approved Prime Minister de Valera's policy of 
neutrality, and on September 3, the German Minis-
ter to Dublin, Dr. Eduard He1npel, informed the 
President that the Germa11 Government would re-
spect 'Eire's neutrality provided that neutrality 
was adhei-.ed to. Ireland's neutrality thus became 
a reality on the day on which hostilities were de-
.clared. (The London Times, September 4, 1939.} 
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A subject 'vhich arose for consideration shortly 
after the commenceme11t of the 'var was merchant 
shipping registration. Sn1ce Ireland had declared 
neutrality and since this status had been immedi-
ately accepted by all belligerents, it appeared at 
first that ships having Irish registry would prob-
ably welcome the right to use the Irish flag since 
this should be respected as a neutral flag in accord 
with the provisions of international law. Indeed 
it would have been thought that Ireland would have 
been confronted with the problem of British ships 
seeking registry, a matter which would ordinarily 
present no problem, but which might draw sharp 
German protest if permitted after the outbreak 
of war. 
. On the contrary, one ship was transferred from 
Irish to British registry while at sea and was 
sunk by a German submarine when allegedly flying 
the Irish flag, possibly innocently, since it might not 
have been informed of the change of registry. In 
addition, other ships were transferred and in some 
instances the transfers appear to have been made 
at the insistence of the crews, who were reported 
to have expressed a preference for sailing under 
the British flag. 
"In the dispatch of the 15th it was reported that three 
British and Irish Steam Packet Company mail ships had 
transferred from Irish to British registry, while on the 19th 
a similar transfer of three L. M.S. ships was announced and 
the probable transfer of other ships of the same line, then 
registered in Dublin, 'vas predicted. In the case of the 
L. ~f. S. ships, the reason given for transfer was the refusal 
of the crews to sail, since otherwise they feared that, if sunk, 
their dependents would not be compensated for injury or 
loss of life." 
(The London Times, September 19, 1939.) 
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By the end of September, according to a Teport 
made to Dail Eireann by Mr. MacEntee, Minister 
of Commerce and Industry, 18 ships had been with-
drawn from Irish and transferred to British regis-
try. These sb).ps, all owned by two companies, 
incorporated in Great Britain, accounted for a 
large portion of the shipping tonnage which had 
been under Irish registry under the Mercha11t Ship-
ping Act, 1894. (Eire, Dail Eireann, Parliamell-
tary Debates, Official Report, September 27, 1939, 
col. 220-221.) 
The Parlian1ent of the Union of South Africa 
on September 5, 1939, rejected the proposal of 
Prime Minister Hertzog that relations with the 
belligerent countries remain unchanged by a vote 
of 80 to 66, and the Union entered the war on the 
side of Great Britain llnder the leadership of a 11ew 
cabinet headed ;by General Smuts. (New York 
Times, September 6, 1939.) The Prime Ministers 
of Australia and New Zealand a11nounced on Sep-
tember 3 that their Dominions were at war 'vith 
Germany (New York Times, September 4, 1939), 
and also at Ottawa on September 3, 1939, it was 
announced by the Government that Canada was at 
war with Germany according to the principle that 
"when Britain is at war, Canada is at war.'' (N e'v 
York Times, September 4, 1939.) However, this 
governmental statement 'vas not followed by any 
forn1al declaration of 'var, Canada was 11ot incll1ded 
as a belligerent in President Roosevelt's first neu-
trality proclamation on September 5, and it 'vas 
not until September 10, 1939, that Canada by Par-
liamentary action formally became a belligerent. 
What the exact status of Canada was from Sep-
te111ber 3 to Septen1ber 10 is something for lawyers 
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to investigate, but the fact ren1ains that Canada, 
along 'vith three other Domi11ions, was not neutral 
at any time, and that the Irish Free State succeeded 
in its attempt to follow the line of neutrality. 
In Situation II, therefore, if the Dominion of 
Vinta is the Irish Free State, the Vincent is a 
cruiser of a neutral power and may remain indefi-
nitely in the canal port. If Vinta, however, hap-
pens to be Canada, New Zealand, Australia, or the 
Union of South Africa, the Vincent should be 
treated as a belligerent warship and should be sub-
ject to all the neutrality regulations as to length 
of stay, repairs, supplies, etc. 
AIRPLANES IN NEUTRAL TERRITORY 
It can now be said to be international law that 
belligerent war planes have no right to fly into or 
through neutral jurisdiction. The subjacent neu-
tral state has complete jurisdiction over the air, 
and the practice of neutrals in the last war and 
the provisions of codes and conventions since that 
time established the fact that the military pla11es 
of belligerents are barred from flight in neutral 
air. Naval airplanes attached to a warship are 
considered to be a part of the ship as long as they 
are in contact with the vessel. Such planes, there-
fore, if actually on board a 'varship, may enter a 
neutral harbor, but they may not leave the 'varves-
sel to fly over the neutral's domain. (See Spaight, 
"Air Power and War Rights'' pp. 421-433.) 
Fron1 1914 to 1918 The Netherlands, Switzerland, 
and other neutrals barred belligerent military 
planes from their superadjacent air and enforced 
their prohibitions by gunfire. (See N·aval War 
College, International Law Situations, 1936, pp. 
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74-75.) The United States proclaimed in 1915 
that: 
Aircraft of a belligerent power, public or private, are for-
bidden to descend or arise with the jurisdiction of the United 
States at the Canal Zone or to pass through the air spaces 
above the lands and 'vaters within said jurisdiction. (Naval 
''Tar College, International Law Situations, 1915, p. 14; see 
also Proclamation of May 23, 1917 .Naval 'Var College, In-
ternational Law Situations, 1917, p. 245.) 
_The Conimissio11 of Jurists report of 1923 stipu-
lates that: 
.A-t\_rticle 40: Belligerent 1nilitary aircraft are forbidden to 
enter the jurisdiction of a neutral state. 
Article 41: Aircraft on board vessels of 'var, including 
aircraft carriers, shall be regarded as part of such vessels. 
Article 42: A neutral government must use the means at 
its disposal to prevent the entry within its jurisdiction of 
belligerent military aircraft and to compel the1n to alight if 
they have entered such jurisdiction. 
A neutral governn1ent shall use the means at its disposal 
to intern any belligerent military aircraft which is 'vithin its 
jurisdiction after having alighted for any reason 'vhatso-
ever, together with its crew and the passengers,.if any. 
Harvard Draft Code, Rights and Duties of N eu-
tral States i11 Naval and Aerial War, op. cit. 
declares: 
Article 94: A neutral State shall require a belligerent mili-
tary aircraft which is in its territory at the tilne of outbreak 
of war, to depart therefrom within twelve hours. The neu-
tral State shall use the means at its ·disposal to intern 
belligerent military aircraft found in its territory after the 
expiration of this period. 
Article 95 : A neutral State shall use the means at its 
disposal: 
(a) To prevent belligerent n1ilitary aircraft fron1 enter-
ing its territory; and 
(b) to compel the1n to alight if they have ente.red, and ·· 
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(c) To intern them after they have alighted, 'vhether the 
landing be voluntary or forced, together 'vith persons and 
property on board. 
The Havana Co11vention on Maritime Neutrality, 
1928, (Hudson li1ternational Legislation Vol. IVt 
p. 2401), states in .Article 14 that: 
The airships of belligerents shall not fly above the terri-
tory or the territorial "raters of neutrals if it is not in con-
formity with the regulations of the latter. 
From the Danish rules 011 neutrality, .Article 8; 
of 1938 (Scandinavian Rules of Neutrality, .Ameri-
can Journal of International Law, October 1938, 
Official Documents, p. 145) ~ comes again a similar 
statement declaratory of international law on this 
subject: 
l\filitary aircraft of the belligerents, with the exception of 
aerial ambulances and aerial transports on board warships, 
shall not be admitted into Danish territory, except "~hen 
regulations to the contrary apply or may become applicable 
so far as certain spaces are concerned conformable to the 
general principles of international law. 
In his proclamation prescribing regulations con-
cerning neutrality in the Canal Zone, September 
5, 1939, (See the appendix of this volume for the 
complete proclamation) the President stated that: 
No belligerent aircraft shall be navigated into, 'vi thin, or 
through the air spaces above the territory or waters of the 
Canal Zone. 
NEUTRAL TERRITORY AS A BASE 
One of the rules fundamental to the entire legal 
edifice of neutrality is tl1at which specifies that neu-
tral territory shall not be used as a base of 1nilitary 
or naval operations, and neutral po,vers are re-
qliired to use the 1nea11s at their disposal to prevent 
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Sllch employ1ne11t on the behalf of one of the bellig-
erents. Expeditions are not to set forth from or 
sail from neutral jurisdiction, and neutrals must 
endeavor to prevent a belligerent fleet from using 
neutral territory as a base of supplies or as a source 
of military information and guidance. For these 
reasons belligerents may not erect or operate radio 
stations on neutral soil and must not attempt to 
obtain information by means of special signals or 
messengers coming from neutral jurisdiction. A 
neutral state is not bound to prevent the transmis-
sion of information by means of cable, coastal com-
n1unication or telecommunication other than radio. 
The distinction between radio, messengers and 
mechanical signal devices on the one hand, and 
cables, mail and telecommunications on the other, 
is based upon the fact that the former can be so 
easily employed for the relaying of important ill-
formation to a belligerent fleet or force outside of 
neutral jurisdiction, and also to the fact that such 
n1ethods of communication are almost impossible for 
the other belligerent to intercept or prevent, where-
as cables and tl1e postal services can scarcely be 
11sed to direct belligerent operations from neutral 
territory and also may be cut or intercepted by 
the opposi11g belligerent. 
Neutrals are no"\v ·Under the obligation to prevent 
the fitting out and arming of planes and the de-
parture of such military airplanes from their terri-
tory, a rule comparable to that evolved in regard 
to surface vessels at the time of the Alaban1a Clain1s 
.. A.rbitration in the last century. ''An expedition 
n1ay consist of a single airplane if manned and 
equipped in a manner which would enable it to 
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take part in hostilities.'' (From the comn1e11t 011 
Article 46 of the Committee of Jurists Report, 
1923, op. cit.) The Government of the United 
States \Vas confronted with the problem of prevent-
ing the departure of airplanes equipped and ready 
for n1ilitary operations after the repeal of the so-
called Arms Embargo on November 4, 1939. (State-
n1e11t, in Appendix, on flights of military aircraft, 
Dece1nber 7, 1939.) An airpla11e in a condition to 
111ake a hostile attack could not legally be permitted 
to leave American jurisdiction, and certainly the 
United States could not permit the departure of a 
1nilitary or 11aval belligerent plane carrying a Illes-
senger to a cruiser of a belligerent po\ver. The 
rules i11 regard to the flight of belligerent military 
planes over neutral territory and those forbidding 
the use of neutral territory as a base \vould be 
violated if such an event \vere permitted to occur. 
NEUTRALITY LAW RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF 
AMERICAN PORTS: NOVEMBER 4, 1939 
Sec. 10 (a)-,Vhenever, during any 'var in 'vhich the 
United States is neutral, the President, or any person there-
unto authorized by him, shall have cause to believe that any 
vessel~ do1nestic or foreign, 'vhether requiring clearance or 
not, is about to carry out of a port or from the jurisdiction 
of the United States, fuel, men, arms, ammunition, iinple-
ments of ''ar, supplies, dispatches, or information to any 
'varship, tender, or supply ship of a State na1ned in a procla-
Ination issued under the authority of Section 1 (a), but the 
evidence is not dee1ned sufficient to justify forbidding the 
departure of the vessel as provided for by Section 1, Title V, 
Chapter 30, of the act approved June 15, 1V17 ( 40 Stat. 217, 
221; U. S. C., 193± Edition, Title 18, Sec. 31), and if, in the 
President's judgn1ent, such action 'vill serve to n1aintain 
peace bet,Yeen the United States and foreign States, or to 
247670-40-7 
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protect the con11nercial interests of the United States and 
its citizens, or to promote the security or neutrality of the 
United States, he shall have the power and it shall be his duty 
to require the owner, master, or person in con1mand thereof, 
before. departing from a port or from the jurisdiction of the 
United States, to give a bond to the United States, with suffi-
cient sureties, in such amount as he shall deem proper, con-
ditioned that the vessel will not deliYer the n1en, or any fuel, 
supplies, dispatches, information, or any part of the cargo, 
to any "\Yarship, tender, or supply ship of a State ntunecl in a 
proclamation issued under the authority of Section 1 (a). 
(b) If the President, or any person thereunto authorized 
by hin1, shall find that a vessel, do1nestic or foreign, in a port 
of the United States has previously departed fron1 a port or 
fro1n the jurisdiction of the. United States during such "-ar 
and delivered men, fuel, supplies, dispatches, infor1nation 
or any part of its cargo to a "rarship, tender or supply ship of 
a State na1ned in a proclamation issued under the authority 
of Section 1 (a) he may prohibit the departure of such 
vessel during the duration of the "\Yar. 
(c) 'Vhenever the President shall have issued a procla-
Ination under Section 1 (a) he may, while such procla1nation 
is in effect, require the owner, n1aster or person in conunancl 
of any vessel, foreign or do1nestic, before departing fro1n the 
United StatBs, to give a bond to the United States, with 
sufficient sureties, in such amount as he shall dee1n proper, 
conditioned that no alien sea1nan who arrived on such 
vessel shall ren1ain in the United States for a longer period 
than that pern1itted under the regulations, as a1nended from 
tilne to tin1e, issued pursuant to Section 33 of the In11nigra-
tion Act of Feb. 5, 1917 (U. S. C., Title 8, Sec. 168). Sot-
withstanding the provisions of said section, he 1nny issue 
regulations "\Yith respect to the landing of such sea1nen as 
he dee1ns necessary to insure their departure either on such 
vessel or another vessel at the expense of such o"\vner, n1aster 
or person in command. 
(Public resolution No. 54, 76th Cong., 2d sess.) 
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PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION SEPTEMBER 5, 
1939 
.A1nong the acts forbidden by proclamatio11 of 
the President on September 5, 1939, \Vere the fol-
lowing: 
11. l(no,vingly beginning or setting on foot or providing 
or preparing a means for or furnishing the money for~ or 
taking part in, any military or naval expedition or enterprise 
to be carried on fron1 the territory or jurisdiction of the 
United States against the territory or don1inion of a bel..-
ligerent. 
12. Dispatching fro1n the United States, or any place sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof, any vessel, domestic or for-
eign, 'vhich is about to carry to a 'varship, tender or supply 
ship of a belligerent any fuel, arms, ammunition, men, sup-
plies, dispatches or inforn1ation shipped or receiYed on board 
'vithin the jurisdiction of the United States. 
( 4 Federal Register, p. 3809.) 
CODES AND CONVENTIONS ON USE OF 
NEUTRAL TERRITORY 
.Article 3 of Hague Convention V of 1907 a11d 
article 5 of Hague Convention XIII, 1907, co11taii1 
provisions which forbid belligerents to erect \vire-
less telegraphy stations on neutral soil or to employ 
neutral ports and waters as a base of 11aval opera-
tions. .Article 3 of the Havana Convention 011 
Maritime Neutrality, op. cit., contains a lil{e pro-
hibition. .Article 46 of the previously cited Jurists 
Report deals \vith the subject of departure of bel-
ligerent airplanes, and in sectj 011 2 of the san1e 
article provides that the neutral is bound "to pre-
vent the departure of an aircraft the cre\V of \vhich 
includes any member of the con1batant forces of a 
belligerent po\ver. '' Relevant articles fron1 the 
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Harvard Draft Code on Neutrality, op. cit., are as 
follO\VS: 
~<-\..rticle 9: ( 1) a neutral State shall use the n1eans at its 
disposal to preYent: 
(a) the erection or operation of any radio station 
"~ithin its jurisdiction by a belligerent; and 
(b) the transn1ission from its jurisdiction of 1nilitary 
infor1nation destined for a belligerent by radio or 
by mechanical means of co1n1nunication. 
(2) A neutral State is not bound to use the n1eans at its 
disposal to prevent the transmission from its territory of 
military infor1nation destined for a belligerent by means of 
postal comn1unication, telecon11nnnications other than radio, 
1nessengers or other 1neans of con1munication not provided 
for in section ( 1) of this article. 
Article 99: A neutral state shall use the n1eans at its dis-
posal: 
(a) T'o preYent the fitting out or ar1ning "\Yithin its terri-
tory of an aircraft 'vhich is intended to engage in hostile 
operations against a belligerent; 
(b) To preYent, subject to Article 94, the flight fron1 its 
territory of any aircraft 'vhich is intended to engage in hos-
tile operations against a belligerent or "\Yhich is intended to 
perform services of a n1ilitary character for a belligerent. 
UNITED STATES TREATY WITH PANAMA 
On July 26, 1939, a general treaty between the 
United States and Panama, signed at vVashington 
011 Niarch 2, 1936, \vas proclaimed by the Preside11t 
and \vent into effect on that day. This treaty pro-
vided for a revision i11 certain particulars of the 
United States-Panama Treaty of 1903 (Treaty Se-
ries No. 431) and also contained provisions sup-
plementary to the earlier agreement. A summary 
of the articles of the treaty, as printed in the De-
partn1ent of State Bulletin (Vol. I, No. 5, July 29, 
1939, pp. 83-85) is as follows: 
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Article I establishes a basis of friendship and cooperation 
bet,Yeen Panama and the United States. 
Article II. The co1npliance of Panama 'Yith the provisions 
of article II of the convention of N oven1ber 18, 1903, in 
turning over to the United States additional lands and "·a-
ters beyond those specifically mentioned there is recognized. 
The requirement of further lands and ""aters is considered 
i1nprobable by both Goveriunents, but they nevertheless 
recognize their joint obligation to insure the continuous 
operation of the Canal and agree to reach the necessary 
understanding should additional lands and 'vaters be in fact 
necessary for this purpose. 
Article III contains various provisions restricting the 
co1nmercial activities of the United States in the Canal Zone 
in order that Panan1a 1nay take advantage of the. commercial 
opportunities inherent in its geographical situation. In this 
article are listed the classes of persons 'vho n1ay reside in 
the Canal Zone and the persons 'vho are entitled to Inake 
purchases in the Canal Zone commissaries. 
Article IV provides for the free entry of Inerchandise 
entering Panama destined for agencies of the United States 
Govern1nent and provides that no taxes shall be in1 posed 
upon persons in the service of the United States entering 
Pana1na or upon residents of Panan1a entering the Canal 
Zone. 
Article V provides that port facilities other than those 
o'vned by the Panama Railroad Co. in the ports of Panan1a 
and Colon Inay be operated only by Pa.nan1a; exempts fron1 
Panamanian taxation vessels using the Canal which do not 
touch at ports under Pana1nanian jurisdiction; and provides 
for the establish1nent of Panamanian customhouses 'vithin 
the Canal Zone. The United States undertakes to adopt 
such administrative regulations as 1nay be necessary to assist 
Panama in controlling iininigration into that country. 
Article 'li revises article VII of the convention of No-
vember 18, 1903, in that the United States renounces the 
right to acquire, by the exercise of the right of eminent 
domain, lands or properties in or near the cities of Panamtl, 
and Colon, although retaining the right to purchase nec-
essary lands or properties. The third paragraph of the said 
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article VII, granting the United States the right to inter-
Yene in the cities of Pana1na and Colon and the territory 
adjacent thereto for the purpose of maintaining order, is 
abrogated. 
Article VII provides that beginning 'vith the 1934 annuity 
payn1ent the annual amounts of these payn1ents shall be four 
hundred thirty thousand balboas (B/430,000.00) or the equi-
Yalent thereof. In a supplementary exchange of notes the 
balboa is defined as having a gold content equal to that of 
the present United States dollar . 
... -\.rticle \TIII provides for a corridor under Panamanian 
jurisdiction to connect the city of Colon with other territory 
of Panama . 
..:-\..rticle IX establishes a si1nilar corridor under American 
jurisdiction to connect the l\Iadden Dam area with the Canal 
Zone proper . 
... t\.rticle X provides that in case of mnergency both Govern-
Inents will take such measures of prevention and defense as 
they 1nay consider necessary for the protection of their com-
mon interests. 
~-\.rticle XI reserves to each country all rights enjoyed by 
Yirtue of treaties now in force between the two countries, and 
preserves all obligations therein established, with the excep-
tion of those rights and obligations specifically revised by 
the present treaty. The juridical status of the Canal Zone, as 
defined in article III of the 1903 convention, thereby remains 
unaltered. 
Article XII provides that the treaty shall take effect im-
n1ediately on the exchange of ratifications in vVashington. 
There "·ere 16 exchanges of notes signed on March 2, 1936, 
and 1 signed on February 1, 1939, interpreting and defining 
certain provisions of the General Treaty. These notes will 
be printed in ,.freaty Series No. 945. 
On the occasion of the exchange of ratifications of the Gen-
eral Treaty Between the United States and Panama, signed 
l\Iarch 2, 1936, the Secretary of State made the following 
ren1arks: 
"The present occasion marks an important milestone in our 
relations with the Republic of Panama. It will be recalled 
that the convention of 1903 was drafted at a time when the 
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Pana1na Canal was only a drea1n and that consequently it was 
i1npossible to foresee and to provide for the n1any varied 
phases of our relations ·with Pana1na 'vhich ''ould spring 
fro1n the continuous operation of the Canal and its attendant 
'Yorks and establishtnents. 
"Dissatisfaction on the part of the Republic of Panama 
''ith certain of the proYisions of the convention of 1903 arose 
early, and various atten1pts 'vere made, many of them success-
ful, to solYe certain specific probletns either informally or by 
agreetnent. The present General Treaty is the result of many 
painstaking hours of negotiation and preparation. It is a 
doctunent which we hope responds to the genuine and legiti-
lnate aspirations of the Government and people of Panama 
yet which not only continues existing safeguards and provi-
sions for the operation, n1aintenance, sanitation, and protec-
tion of the Canal from our point of view, but by associating 
the Republic of Pana1na in this work, accords even greater 
security and efficiency to the Canal, either in its present form 
or should it become necessary, in an expanded form." 
(Treaty Series, No. 945.) 
APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT CASE 
Inasmuch as State K has the san1e rights in the 
Canal Zone leased fro1n State L as those possessed 
by the United States in the Pana1na Canal Zone, 
State I{, though 11ot possessing title to the zone, 
has all the at1thority which it would have if it were 
the true sovereig11. State I{ as a neutral is there-
fore responsible for 'vhat transpires in the zone 
and must uphold the obligations of a neutral under 
internationalla,v. The Vigo} a belligerent cruiser, 
had no right to send the airplane V-1} a n1ilitary 
craft, i11to neutral territory a11d the V -1 should 
have been interned by State I{ authorities. Not 
only 'vas the initial entry of the V -1 a violation 
of the neutrality of State J(, but also its departure 
\vas a11 illegal act which State I{ should have used 
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the means at its disposal to prevent. The V -1, 
equipped for war and .. capable of engaging in hostile 
action, constituted an expedition. Transportation 
of the naval attacl1e of the legation of tl1e belliger-
ent State V wl1o had important information to 
transn1it to the commander of the Vigo, rendered 
the action all the more culpable. The territory of 
State I( 'vas being used as a base both by the depar-
ture of a plane ready for war use and by the 
sending of a special messenger conveying 111ilitary 
communications to the commander of a belligerent 
warship at sea. 
It is true that the attache e11joys ft1ll diplon1atic 
immunities a11d it is also true that State I( is u11der 
110 obligation to prevent couriers from carrying 
messages to a foreign government, but tl1is last 
stateme11t refers to regular diplomatic correspond-
ence and not to directing operations of ships at 
sea. The attache is not permitted under interna-
tional law to engage in activities which involve vio-
lations of the neutrality of the state to "rhich he 
]s accredited. Had the Vigo co111e into a canal 
port, the attache could legally have gone on board 
if he had so desired, but flying otlt to a 'varship 
of his nation is an entirely different matter and 
one that very definitely turns the territory of the 
zone i11to a belligerent base of operations. If tl1e 
Vigo had been in distress, it could have come i11to 
port itself or else it could have radioed to those on 
shore for help and needed Stlpplies. The authorities 
of neutral State I( are bou11d to succor and relieve 
tl1e distress, if genuine, of vessels at sea a11d n1ight 
have sent out one of their own planes or ships to 
render aid. Officials of State K, ho,vever, 111ust in 
110 'vay implement the fighti11g capacity of the TTigo 
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&Ild must draw the line very carefully bet\vee11 aid 
to a ship in distress and permitting a belligerent 
'varship to increase its fighti11g ability. In this 
situation, therefore, State I( must not countenance 
the flight of a belligerent naval airplane into its 
jurisdiction and is under an obligation to prevent 
such craft and important messages from being 
transn1itted to a belligerent fleet off its coast. The 
tactics of the Vigo, the V -1 and the naval attache 
are gravely suspect. The needed medical supplies 
could l1ave been obtained in ways which did not 
jnvolve the n~utrality rights and obligations of 
State I( in the Canal Zone. 
RESU~iE 
The principle of contiguous zones appears to 
have been established in international law, but no 
consensus exists as to what the widths of such areas, 
especially those for defense purposes, ought to be. 
The Declaration of Panama which asserted juris-
dictioi1 for purposes of neutrality patrol over parts 
of the sea to a distance 300 miles from the shore 
is not binding in international law, though the 
procla1nation may 'vell have been justified for polit-
ical or other reasons. In regard to the status of 
the British Dominions, a11 era of academic ques-
tionings came to an end when the Irish Free State 
declared its neutrality on September 3, 1939, and 
'vas regarded as a neutral by all the belligerents. 
It has been proved that the British Dominions ca1L 
be neutral because one of them actually has been 
nelltral. Concerning other aspects of neutrality 
the introduction of the airplane has resulted in the 
n1aki11g of so1ne new rules and in the adaptation of 
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some of the former ones, to a new instrument of 
\va.rfare. Belligerent military airplanes, unlike 
belligerent surface craft, are barred entirely from 
11eutral jurisdiction. The actual practice of states 
in the last war led to the creation of this ne\v pro-
hibition. When it come to the departure of planes 
from neutral jurisdiction, the rules in regard to 
''fitting out a11d arming'' have been taken over and 
applied to aircraft. Neutrals 111ust use the means 
at their disposal to keep planes from leaving which 
are in a condition to take part in a military 
operation. 
SOLUTION 
(a) The commander of the l\.o1nlo should act to 
l)rotect the v erra, thus conforn1ing to the domestic 
law of his own state. The legality of the protective 
zo11e u11der international la\v depends upon its ac-
ceptance by other powers. In this instance, there-
fore, the protective zone is not recognized by inter-
11atio11al la\v and State U may attempt to hold 
State K internationally responsible. 
(b) It is legally possible for \Tinta to be a neutral 
state. If tl1e Dominion of Vinta is recognized as 
a 11eutral by the belligerents, the V1:ncent may re-
n1ain in the canal ports indefinitely. 
( c} The V -1 has no right to enter neutral juris-
diction and the authorities of State I( in the c·anal 
Zone should have used the n1eans at their disposal 
to prevent the departure of V-1. 
(d) States L, U, and V are not obliged to rec-
ognize the zone and their protests are legally valid. 
